Extended abstract
This paper is one part of a new chapter for my survey Leonardo to the Internet: Technology and Culture from the Renaissance to the Present (JHUP 2nd edition 2011).
2 It examines the presentday "dominance of the digital" as one of the techno-cultural "eras" creating this book's narrative structure. Moore's Law is often taken to be at the center of the computing and information revolution; it is a staple of journalistic and popular accounts of technology. Scholars such as Bill Aspray and Cyrus Mody have examined its impact on technology policy and the character of academic science, but few (apart from Ethan Mollick and Robert Schaller) have delved into its genesis and genealogy.
3 Even fewer have shown the enthusiasm of Paul Ceruzzi's "Moore's Law and Technological Determinism" (2005), which argues "Moore's law plays a significant role in determining the current place of technology in society (…). (…) raw technological determinism is at work."
4 In this section of my new chapter (one of four), my argument is that it needs to be understood not through before/after snapshots, let alone as "raw technological determinism," but rather through historical attention to narrative and process. I see three overlapping phases: preconditions prior to 1975; its emergence and shaping from 1975 to 2004; and the development of national and global networks for "roadmapping" and R&D synchronization through 2016.
Moore's Law is often traced to a 1965 article that Gordon Moore, then director of research for Fairchild Semiconductor, published in Electronics magazine.
5 Moore himself acknowledged no one paid any attention until 1975 when his 10-year prediction that the number of semiconductor elements on an integrated circuit would be 65,000 was confirmed. It became an article of faith. The US National Science Foundation identified Moore's Law as a "selffulfilling prediction that drives industry-wide planning." Several aspects of the US semiconductor industry before 1975 are notable. First, from the 1960s the industry was composed of companies that engaged in bad-faith cut-throat competition (the very opposite of cooperative arrangements that later emerged). Second, with The international roadmaps began in 1998 under the auspices of the industry-leading trade associations from US, Japan, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan. By 2003 more than 900 companies participated. Each biennial roadmap made detailed predictions for the next 15 years. The roadmap from 1992 predicted that feature sizes would shrink by five times, that gates per chip would expand by sixty times, and that supply voltages (a critical measure for battery-powered cell phones) would drop to just 1.5 volts. These measures provided longterm targets for companies across the world to coordinate their R&D efforts, to plan the next generations of manufacturing facilities, to specify the wavelengths for their chemical-resists, and much else. Unwittingly, the 1992 roadmap predicted the end. It indicated that in 2004 non-portable chips would exceed 100 watts in heat dissipation, which (as Intel found that same year) resulted in
